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A COMPARISON OF COMPARATIVE
NEGLIGENCE STATUTES: JURY ALLOCATION
OF FAULT-DO DEFENDANTS RISK PAYING
FOR THE FAULT OF NONPARTY
TORTFEASORS?1
I. INTRODUCTION
party [pW' t6] n. 1: a person or group taking one side of a question; 2: a
person or group concerned in an action or affair: participant; 3: a group of
persons detailed for a common task.2
The adoption of comparative negligence statutes in a majority of
jurisdictions has prompted the legal definition of the word "party" to grow in
importance.3 This definition of "party" determines the parties to whom a jury
may allocate fault.
1. The importance of this topic is demonstrated by the number of tort suits filed each year.
According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts' Federal Court Management
Statistics, tort suits comprised 21.7% of all civil suits filed in Federal Courts in 1995:
NATURE AND NUMBER OF CIVIL SUITS FILED IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS IN 1995
Prisoner Petitions 63,550
Torts 53,986
Civil Rights 36,600
Contracts 29,360
Labor Suits 14,954
Social Security 9354
Real Property 6869
Copyright, Patent and Trademark 6866
Government-Initiated Forfeitures, Penalties and 4719
Tax Suits
Government-Initiated Recovery of 1822
Overpayments and Enforcement of Judgments
Antitrust 781
All Other Civil 19,474
Total 248,335
Nature and Number of Civil Suits Filed in the Federal Courts in 1995; Busy Prisons, NAT'L L.J., Aug.
26, 1996, at A1, A5.
2. THE MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 509 (3d ed. 1974).
3. Presently, only Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia have retained contributory
negligence. The other 46 states have rejected contributory negligence and adopted some form of
comparative negligence. See Kathleen M. O'Connor & Gregory P. Sreenan, Apportionment of
Damages: Evolution ofa Fault-Based System of Liability for Negligence, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 365,
369-70, nn. 20-21 (1996).
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State negligence statutes define party in three different ways:
1. all litigants in the lawsuit; or
2. persons involved in the tort; or
3. defendants involved in the lawsuit
When a narrow definition of party is used, the jury is limited in
determining who should share the blame for the tort, with defendants
possibly shouldering the blame for non-party tortfeasors. On the other hand,
a broad definition allows the jury to consider more parties, but may limit the
plaintiff's recovery. Because of the inequities to the defendant that come
from a narrow definition of "party", this Note proposes that states adopt a
new comparative negligence statute that allows the jury to consider the fault
of everyone who may have contributed to the plaintiff's injury.
This Note focuses on the definition of "party" and analyzes the merits of
definitions one and two. This Note will not examine definition three because
it refers back to contributory negligence, where any fault of the plaintiff bars
recovery, and is used only by a few states.4 Part II of this Note will briefly
examine the history of comparative and contributory negligence. Part 11 will
examine how different states have defined "party" and the results that these
various definitions have achieved. Finally, Part IV proposes that a new
statute, which comports with traditional principles of efficiency and fairness,
should be adopted in lieu of the current state comparative negligence statutes.
II. CONTRiBUTORY AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
A. History
In common law tort cases, any fault by the plaintiff served as a complete
bar to recovery. In 1809, this rule was established in England in Butterfield v.
Forrester,5 and recognized in the United States in 1824, in Smith v. Smith.6
For a plaintiff to lose a suit in a contributory negligence jurisdiction, his or
her conduct must fall below the standard of reasonable care and must
4. Under the theory of contributory negligence, if there is any fault on the part of the plaintiff,
the claim is dismissed; therefore, once that threshold question has been answered, the jury can focus
on apportioning fault among the defendants. Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia have
retained contributory negligence. See O'Connor & Sreenan, supra note 3.
5. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (KB. 1809). See Timothy Bettenga, Instructing the Jury on
Comparative Fault Issues: A Current Guide to Understanding the Nature of Comparison in
Comparative Fault, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 807 (1988).
6. See O'Connor & Sreenan, supra note 3, at 367 & n.9 (citing 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 621, 624
(1824)).
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contribute as a legal cause to the harm that the plaintiff suffered.7 Under this
rule, a plaintiff who was responsible for any negligence whatsoever would
not recover any damages, while a fault-free plaintiff could recover all of his
damages. Hence, this rule was known as the "all or nothing rule."8 Professors
Prosser and Keeton advance three possible explanations for the harshness of
this rule. First, the contributory negligence doctrine had a penalty element, so
that a negligent plaintiff was denied recovery as punishment for his wrongful
conduct.9 Second, the "clean hands" doctrinel° justified the denial of
recovery to a negligent plaintiff." Third, contributory negligence was based
on the belief that courts could not properly apportion fault between two
parties for a single injury.12
The contributory negligence doctrine began to dissipate as state
legislatures and courts realized that it was unreasonable to place the entire
risk of loss on the plaintiffs shoulders. 13 The courts recognized that the
defendant was in a better position than the plaintiff to bear the financial
burden of the loss.14
The doctrine of comparative negligence developed from this rationale.
The basis for this doctrine is that courts should apportion fault among the
plaintiffs and the defendants. In addition to the policy of allocating losses
among negligent parties, several courts also reasoned that because there was
no longer a need to protect industry from "legal fetters,"'" the rule of
contributory negligence had no justification. 6 Other courts noted that the
contributory negligence bar did not deter defendants, however, comparative
7. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 451
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEETON]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 463, 464
(1965).
8. O'Connor & Sreenan, supra note 3, at 367-68 (citing Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080,
1090 (Fla. 1987)).
9. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 7, § 65, at 452.
10. One explanation of this doctrine is as follows:
Under this doctrine, equity will not grant relief to a party, who, as actor, seeks to set judicial
machinery in motion and obtain some remedy, if such party in prior conduct has violated
conscience or good faith or other equitable principle. One seeking equitable relief cannot take
advantage of one's own wrong.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 172 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).
11. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 7, § 65, at 452.
12. Seeid.
13. See id. at 468-69.
14. See id. at 469.
15. Simply legal "[c]hains or shackles" that bind. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 748 (4th ed. 1968).
16. See Joseph W. Little, Eliminating the Fallacies of Comparative Negligence and Proportional
Liability, 41 ALA. L. REV. 13, 24 (1989) (citing Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 436-37 (Fla.
1973)); Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886, 893 (II1. 1981) (citing Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41
CAL. L. REv. 1, 4 (1953)).
1998]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
negligence would increase deterrence. 17
B. Comparative Negligence Today
States have arrived at different conclusions on how to treat this doctrine.
Some states only allow courts to apportion certain damages (i.e., only non-
economic damages) to non-party tort-feasors 1 8  Other states have a
percentage of fault ceiling for plaintiff recovery whereby he will not recover
if the jury finds that his contribution was more than a legislatively
determined percentage of fault.19 Finally, some states also have different
types of contribution laws, where a plaintiff can recover from one defendant
who can then obtain contribution from other defendants.20 Furthermore, there
are different variations of comparative fault doctrines, including both pure
and modified comparative fault.2
Regardless of these permutations and combinations of comparative
negligence law, the problem that this Note addresses remains constant: to
whom does the jury apportion negligence? It is this determination that is
affected by the state legislature's definition and the court's interpretation of
the word "party" in the language of the comparative negligence statute.
Resolution of this question is important for both plaintiffs and defendants.
A plaintiff can only recover if the party in the suit is found liable. A narrow
reading of "party" means that the jury will only consider parties to the suit.
17. See Alvis, 421 N.E.2d at 895; Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037, 1048 (Alaska 1975). According
to Little: "Although the opinions did not develop the point, this argument, to make sense, must assume
that certain categories of people or institutions are more likely to be defendants than plaintiffs, and that
the 'defendant class' received an unbalanced advantage from the contributory negligence rule vis-A-vis
the 'plaintiff classes."' Little, supra note 16, at 72, n.56.
18. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3) (West 1996).
19. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2 (West 1996).
20. See O'Connor & Sreenan, supra note 3. Their article describes the various methods that
states have adopted regarding joint and several liability. Arkansas, Kentucky, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, and Wyoming have abolished joint and several liability, and each defendant is only liable for
the percentage of the plaintiff's damages equal to the defendant's fault. Florida, Nevada, New Mexico,
Arizona, and Colorado have abolished joint and several liability with exceptions ranging from
concerted actions, intentional torts, and hazardous wastes. Georgia, Idaho, Michigan, Missouri, Ohio,
Oklahoma, and Washington abolished joint and several liability in cases where the plaintiff is also
negligent. California, Florida, New York, and Oregon distinguish between economic and non-
economic damages. Illinois, Iowa, and, New Jersey condition their abolition of joint and several
liability on certain levels of fault for either the plaintiff or the defendant. Finally, in Connecticut,
Michigan, and Missouri, reallocation of damages may occur among the defendants and the plaintiff if
damages cannot be collected from a defendant because of insolvency.
21. Pure comparative negligence requires an allocation of fault to all of the actors. Additionally,
the plaintiff bears the burden of the amount of damages directly proportional to the amount of fault
attributed to him. Various modified comparative negligence jurisdictions require the same allocation of
fault between plaintiffs and defendants. If the plaintiff's fault reached a certain threshold level, either
50% or 50.1%, then the plaintiff's action is barred.
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This means that a plaintiff will recover all damages from those parties, and
the court will apportion fault only to the plaintiff and to those parties.22
Therefore, the jury will not consider parties who contributed to the accident,
but are not defendants, and the present parties will assume the non-parties'
share of fault. If "party" is interpreted broadly, then parties not involved in
the suit23 but involved in the accident will also be apportioned fault.24 In this
scenario, a plaintiff may not recover all of the damages awarded, if the jury
places some fault on an immune party or a party who the plaintiff has
otherwise chosen not to sue. The defendants, however, will pay damages
only in proportion to their percentage of fault.
Ill. How Do STATES DEFINE "PARTY"?
A. Party-All Litigants in the Lawsuit
When a jury considers only the litigants in the lawsuit, parties who
contributed to the accident but are immune from liability will not be
considered. Because a jury's total fault allocation must equal 100%, the
parties to the suit are assigned a percentage of fault that may be higher than it
would have been if all the responsible parties were present in the courtroom.
This frees the plaintiff from worrying about damages being allocated to a
party from whom he or she cannot recover. New Jersey and Pennsylvania are
two of the states whose legislatures have promulgated this result.
1. New Jersey
The trier of fact shall make the following findings of fact... (2) The
extent, in the form of a percentage, of each party's negligence or fault.
The percentage of negligence or fault of each party shall be based on
100% and the total of all percentages of negligence or fault of all the
parties to the suit shall be 100%.25
The New Jersey legislature defines "party" to include only the named
entities to the suit. The results of this can be seen in the treatment of non-
parties, who are not allocated fault by the jury.26 However, settling co-
22. See, e.g., Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.J. 1995).
23. This can include immune parties, settling codefendants and parties whom the plaintiff chose
not to bring into the suit.
24. See, e.g., Connar v. West Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1975).
25. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2 (West 1996) (emphasis added).
26. See Ramos v. Browning Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 476 A.2d 304 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
1998]
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defendants, although they are no longer parties to the suit, are still allocated a
percentage of fault.
27
In Straley v. United States,28 the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey, interpreting New Jersey law, denied the defendant's
motion to consider the fault of the plaintiff's non-party co-employee when
apportioning the liability among the parties.29 The co-worker was driving the
vehicle on which the plaintiff was riding when he was injured.30 The court,
holding that the jury may not consider the non-party's negligence when
apportioning fault,3 l was constrained by the holding in Ramos v. Browning
Ferris Industries.32 Because neither the co-worker nor his employer were
parties to the suit, they could not be considered joint tort-feasors, and
therefore could not be considered by the jury on the issue of comparative
negligence.
33
The seminal New Jersey case that affirmed this point of law is Jarrett v.
Duncan Thecker Associates.34 The plaintiff was injured while on the job, and
the defendant asked to have the non-party employer's negligence allocated
by the jury.35 The court found that New Jersey's comparative negligence
statute clearly limited the jury's deliberations to parties to the suit, rather than
Div. 1984).
27. See Young v. Latta, 589 A.2d 1020 (N.J. 1991).
28. 887 F. Supp. 728 (D.NJ. 1995).
29. See id. at 742-43. In Straley, the plaintiff, Robin Straley, was working as a garbage collector
on a truck owned by Circle Carting, Inc. See id. at 732-33. Plaintiff and his co-worker Rodney Gumaer
admitted to drinking four seven-ounce beers on the day of the accident. See id. Plaintiff was riding on
the back of the garbage truck and was either struck by the mirror of a passing postal truck or slipped
and fell while trying to avoid being struck. See id. His legs were injured by the rear wheels of the
garbage truck and were later amputated below the knees. See id. At the scene of the accident, Gumaer,
the driver, failed a sobriety test. See id. The plaintiff sued the manufacturers of the truck's chassis, the
assembler of the truck, the wholesaler, the shipper, and other various parties who had bought and sold
the truck. See id. at 732-33. The plaintiff, however, did not sue Gumaer. It was his negligence that the
defendants petitioned the court to allow the jury to consider. See id.
30. Seeid. at732.
31. See id. at 742-43.
32. 510A.2d 1152 (N.J. 1986).
33. See Straley, 887 F. Supp. at 742. The court also noted that although the party may be
insulated by law from liability as a joint tortfeasor, that party's negligence may be considered a
"supervening" cause of the damage if 100% of the damage can be causally attributed to it. See id.
However, as a practical matter, the chances of ajury finding this are slim. It is unlikely that, while an
amputee plaintiff sits in a courtroom, a corporate defendant would be able to shift the blame to a
garbage truck driver who would be unable to pay the damage judgement because that would result in
no recovery for the plaintiff.
34. 417 A.2d 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1980). Plaintiff was an employee of Thomas
Procter Company, Inc., and was injured while performing contractual work for the defendant, Duncan
Thecker Associates. See id. at 1065.
35. See id. The employer was not a party to the suit because the workers' compensation bar
prevents plaintiffs from direct suit. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West 1996).
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parties to the transaction,36 and thus did not allow the jury to consider the
employer's fault.
37
The New Jersey courts are less strict in their interpretation of "party"
when the situation involves a settling co-defendant. In Young v. Latta,38 the
court held that a non-settling defendant is entitled to have the settling
defendant's negligence apportioned by the jury.39 Then, regardless of the
actual settlement, the non-settling defendant is entitled to a credit reflecting
the settler's fair share of the verdict amount.40 Thus, a plaintiff may recover
more or less than the jury's award of damages, depending on how good or
bad the settlement is in comparison to the settling defendant's percentage of
fault.41-Furthermore, the settling defendant shall have no additional liability
to any party beyond that provided for in the settlement terms.42 The court's
36. See Jarrett, 417 A.2d at 1067. It is worth noting that although the court ruled that the
language of the statute clearly mandated this ruling, the court would have favored allowing the jury to
consider the employer's negligence. See id. at 1066 (citing Connar v. West Shore Equip. of
Milwaukee, 227 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1975)). The court reasoned, however, that the legislature was
aware of the case of Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 106 A.2d 752 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1954), which held that a tortfeasor may not obtain contribution from an employer subject to the
Workers' Compensation Act because such an employer was not a 'joint tortfeasor" within the meaning
of the Joint Tortfeasors Act. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the legislature's intent indicated that
because an employer could not be a tortfeasor, the jury should not consider the employer's liability
when attributing negligence. See Jarrett, 417 A.2d at 1067.
37. See id.; see also Bencivenga v. JJ.A.M.M., Inc., 609 A.2d 1299, 1303-05 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1992) (holding that a jury should not have been instructed to consider the intentional
conduct of the unnamed, unknown defendant for the purposes of comparing fault under the
comparative fault act because a fictitious party is not a party to the suit; rather, a defendant's
comparative fault should be considered only when the defendant's true name is substituted in an
amended complaint and service is effected); Ramos v. Browing Ferris Indus. of S. Jersey, Inc., 476
A.2d 304, 309 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (holding that a trier of fact cannot better compare the
negligence of an employee with that of a third party if it also assigns a percentage of negligence to the
immune employer).
38. 589A.2d 1020(N.J. 1991).
39. See id. at 1024 (citing Dimogerondakis v. Dimogerondakis, 485 A.2d 338 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1984)).
40. See Young, 589 A.2d at 1020-22. The plaintiff, Steven Young, suffered injuries and, as a
result, sued several doctors and the hospital. See id. The hospital and one doctor were dismissed with
only Dr. Latta and Dr. Alameno remaining as defendants. See id. Young then settled with Dr. Alameno
for $20,000. At trial, the jury apportioned negligence at 20% to Dr. Latta and 80% to Dr. Alameno,
with total damages of $150,000. See id. Therefore, Dr. Latta was only liable for $30,000 (20% of
$150,000). See id. Young ended up recovering only $50,000, because Latta was only liable for his
share of the damages and the plaintiff made a poor settlement with Alameno. See id. at 1020-22.
41. Had the plaintiff recovered more than the jury's award, the remaining defendant would not be
entitled to an additional credit. See, e.g., Theobald v. Angelos, 208 A.2d 129, 134-36 (N.J. 1965).
Therefore, had Dr. Latta been allocated 90% of fault, he would be forced to pay $135,000, so that even
though the jury award was $150,000, the plaintiff's total recovery would be $155,000 ($135,000 from
Dr. Latta plus $20,000 from the Alameno settlement). In addition, the non-settling defendant is not
entitled to any credit if the plaintiff settles with a party found not to be a tortfeasor. See, e.g., Rogers v.
Spady, 371 A.2d 285, 287-88 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
42. See Young, 589 A.2d at 1024; see also Kiss v. Jacob, 650 A.2d 336, (N.J. 1994).
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rationale indicated that the purpose of the comparative negligence statute is
to limit a defendant's liability to the percentage of negligence found against
him. However, this reasoning seems inconsistent with the above discussion,
whereby the jury allocates fault only to parties in the suit. These
inconsistencies demonstrate the flaws in the New Jersey comparative
negligence statute and show why New Jersey should adopt the statute
proposed in Part IV.
2. Pennsylvania
Where recovery is allowed against more than one defendant, each
defendant shall be liable for that proportion of the total dollar amount
awarded as damages in the ratio of the amount of his causal
negligence to the amount of causal negligence attributed to all
defendants against whom recovery is allowed.44
The Pennsylvania legislature has provided for apportionment of liability
only among those defendants against whom recovery is allowed, not among
all persons responsible for a tortious injury.
The leading Pennsylvania case in this area is Ryden v. Johns-Manville
Products.45 In Ryden, the court held that an employer who was immune from
liability because of the workers' compensation bar could not be joined in a
negligence action.46 The court further ruled that the focus of this inquiry
should not be on the inequities that may result from the exclusion of immune
parties from the jury.47 The court cited the clear language of the Pennsylvania
43. See Young, 589 A.2d at 1025.
44. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102(b) (1996) (emphasis added).
45. 518 F. Supp. 311 (W.D. Pa. 1981). In these consolidated cases, plaintiffs and plaintiffs'
decedents sought to recover damages from the manufacturer/supplier of certain asbestos products. See
id. at 313-15. The defendants sought to join the employers. See id. The court joined the employers
because the employees suffered injuries before the enactment of the worker's compensation bar. See
id. The jury was not allowed to allocate fault to employers who were injured after the bar. See id.
46. Seeid, at316.
The Negligence Act does not ... provide for apportionment among allpersons responsible for a
tortious injury. It merely provides for apportionment among those defendants against whom
recovery is allowed. There is no suggestion in that statute that all possible tortfeasors be brought
into court, and certainly no requirement that this be done to achieve the purposes of the act The
trier of fact is simply to apportion liability on a percentage basis among those defendants on the
record against whom recovery is allowed.
Id.
47. See id. The inequities cited by the defendants, which the court held were not enough to stray
from the legislature's language, were: a culpable third party having to pay an entire damage award, or
a negligent employer recouping workers' compensation payments through subrogation. See Ryden,
518 F. Supp. at 316. The federal court relied on the earlier Pennsylvania decisions of Hefferin v.
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statute in holding that only defendants who may be found liable can have
negligence apportioned by the jury.48 Because the employers at issue were
protected by the workers' compensation bar, they could not be found liable,
and therefore could not be joined in the suit or assigned a percentage of fault
by the jury.49
Pennsylvania's treatment of settling co-defendants is similar to that of
New Jersey. The leading case in this area is Thompson v. City of
Philadelphia,5° in which the court held that the defendants' "settlements with
plaintiff did not render the dispute as to the apportionment of liability moot,
since the ultimate apportionment of liability ... will govern the defendants'
rights of contribution amongst each other in a pending contribution action."51
However, unlike New Jersey, Pennsylvania does not necessarily give the
remaining defendants a credit equal to the settling defendants' pro rata
share.5z Despite this distinction, the result for purposes of this Note is the
same as in New Jersey; settling co-defendants still have their fault allocated
Stempkowski, 372 A.2d 869 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) and Arnold v. Borbonus, 390 A.2d 271 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1978).
48. See Ryden, 518 F. Supp. at 315.
49. See id. at 316. For other Pennsylvania cases affirming this point of law, see Tysenn v. Johns-
Manville Corp., 517 F. Supp. 1290, 1295-96 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (holding that where plaintiffs did not
have a negligence claim against the employer due to the exclusive remedy under the Occupational
Disease Act, the employer's alleged negligence had no relevance for the purpose of allocating liability
against other defendants); Heckendom v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 465 A.2d 609, 612 (Pa. 1983)
(holding that because an employer cannot be found liable due to the workers' compensation bar,
liability cannot be apportioned between the defendants and the employer); Kelly v. Carborundum Co.,
453 A.2d 624, 627 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) ("This statute does not provide for apportionment among all
tortfeasors causally responsible for an injury-'It merely provides for apportionment among those
defendants against whom recovery is allowed ....' (citations omitted). The law does not now and
never has required that all possible tort-feasors be made parties to an action. ...
50. 493 A.2d 669 (Pa. 1985).
51. Id. at 671. Although contribution is the rationale behind allowing allocation of fault for a
settling co-defendant, the focus of this Note is on whether fault is allocated, not the impact of
contribution laws. Therefore, contribution will be discussed only minimally throughout the Note.
52. See, e.g., Wirth v. Miller, 580 A.2d 1154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that if the release
signed by the plaintiff and settling party so states, then the remaining defendants are entitled to a credit
equal to the amount of the settlement, regardless of the liability; however, a percentage of fault is still
established for later contribution hearings). But see Charles v. Giant Eagle Markets, 522 A.2d 1 (Pa.
1987) (holding that a non-settling joint tortfeasor is not relieved of responsibility for payment of a
proportionate share of damages where the consideration paid by the settling tortfeasor exceeds his or
her proportionate share of damages as determined by the jury and the release provides for reduction of
the verdict by the pro rata share of the settling joint tortfeasor). While these cases are not
inconsistent-both hold that the settling defendant's negligence is allocated by the jury-the result is
that the plaintiff and settling defendant choose the type of credit that will be given the remaining
defendants. Allowing the plaintiff to choose a dollar amount deduction instead of a proportionate share
deduction creates a scenario whereby a remaining defendant may pay more or less than his
proportionate share. Although this disparity may be recovered in a contribution proceeding, the policy
should be geared towards having a defendant pay the plaintiff only his proportionate share, without
having to participate in a contribution proceeding to recoup some of the overpayment.
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by the jury in a negligence action. However, Pennsylvania's treatment of
settling co-defendants is inconsistent with its treatment of immune parties.
Therefore, Pennsylvania's legislature needs to consider amending the
comparative negligence statute.53
B. Party-Persons Involved in the Tort
When the jury considers all of the entities that contributed to the tort,
regardless of their presence in the suit, a defendant is assured to pay only a
percentage of damages that is equal to their percentage of fault. This results
in greater efficiency because the plaintiff is forced to join all the parties who
may be liable. However, a plaintiff may not recover all damages if some fault
is assigned to a party who cannot be liable to the plaintiff. Wisconsin,
Minnesota, and Florida are examples of states that choose this method of
fault allocation.
1. Wisconsin and Minnesota
The negligence of the plaintiff shall be measured separately against
the negligence of each person found to be causally negligent.5 4
The Wisconsin legislature structured the comparative negligence statute
to result in the allocation of fault among all the parties involved in the
tortious activity. Recently, however, a lower court created an exception to
this general rule.55
The seminal case in Wisconsin and the leading case cited nationwide by
courts on allocation of fault to non-parties 56 is Connar v. West Shore
Equipment ofMilwaukee, Inc.57 In this case, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held that when apportioning negligence the jury must be given the
opportunity to consider the fault of all parties to the transaction, regardless of
whether they are parties to the lawsuit, and regardless of whether they can be
53. For other states using the same definition of "party" as New Jersey and Pennsylvania, see
Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 18.470(2) (1996); Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603 (Or. 1987) (holding that
the comparative fault statutory scheme restricts the jury to consideration of fault of parties to the suit,
and excludes from consideration those persons not in the case, including settling defendants protected
by a covenant not to sue).
54. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045(1) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
55. See Hauboldt v. Union Carbide Corp., 467 N.W.2d 508 (vis. 1991).
56. See, e.g., Johnson v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1226 (8th Cir. 1981);
Gauthier v. O'Brien, 618 So. 2d 825, 829 (La. 1993); Mills v. Brown, 735 P.2d 603, 606 (Or. 1987);
Haderlie v. Sondgeroth, 866 P.2d 703, 727 (vyo. 1993).
57. 227 N.W.2d 660 (Wis. 1975).
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liable to the plaintiff or other tortfeasors, either by operation of law or
because of a prior settlement agreement.5 8 There is only one prerequisite to
sending the negligence of a non-party to the jury: the trial judge must
determine as a matter of law that there is "evidence of conduct, which, if
believed by the jury, would constitute negligence on the part of the person or
other legal entity inquired about."59 Subsequently, the court held that whether
the party or entity is not a party or is immune from further liability is
immaterial.6"
Since this landmark decision, several lower courts have distinguished
cases and held opposite to the Connar principle. In Hauboldt v. Union
Carbide Corp.,61 the court held that where a plaintiff is entirely fault-free,
and a change in apportionment among the defendants would not affect his
amount of recovery, the defendant is not entitled to present complete
evidence of a partially immune co-defendant's negligence.62 The court stated
that the sole reason the jury should be given an opportunity to "consider the
negligence of all persons involved is that adding in the causal negligence of
the omitted tort-feasor(s) may affect the amount of recovery by the injured
party."63 In this case, where one defendant could not be liable to the plaintiff
because of an immunity, and the other defendant was strictly liable, the liable
58. See id. at 662-63. In Connar, the plaintiff's decedent was employed by the Druml Company
when he was killed during the course of his employment. Plaintiff sued both the manufacturer and the
distributor of the Bobcat machine the decedent was operating at the time of his death. Both defendants
requested that the employer's negligence be considered by the jury when apportioning negligence.
This request was refused and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the lower court decision. See
id.
59. Id. at 662-63.
60. See id. The court cited two earlier Wisconsin cases to affirm this point of law. The court
noted that Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963), and Payne v. Bilco Co., 195 N.W.2d 641
(Wis. 1972), both held that the apportionment of negligence by the jury must include all parties whose
negligence may have contributed to the transaction that led to the cause of action. Specifically, the
Payne court stated that "[tihe failure to include the settling tortfeasors and the employer ... would
necessarily have been prejudicial to [the two remaining defendants].... [However,] it was necessary
that all alleged tortfeasors be included in the special verdict for comparison purposes." Payne, 195
N.W.2d at 646.
61. 467N.W.2t508 (Wis. 1991).
62. In this case, the plaintiff, Robert Hauboldt, was an injured fire fighter who sued Union
Carbide, the manufacturer of the defective acetylene tank that exploded during a fire. Union Carbide
brought a third party suit against Coleman, the owner of the land where the tank was being stored.
Union Carbide sought to demonstrate that Coleman's negligence was a defense against the plaintiff's
claim of product defect. However, the judge excluded the evidence of Coleman's negligence. Coleman
was immune under the fire fighter's rule, and only his failure to warn of the tank's presence was
outside the scope of the rule. Coleman's possible negligence in constructing and maintaining the
garage that caught fire was protected by the rule, and therefore, there was no need to produce evidence
on this point, because he would not be liable to the plaintiff or Union Carbide for such conduct. See id.
at 515.
63. Id.
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defendant was not entitled to present evidence of the third party's negligence
because that information was protected under the immunity.
64
Recently, however, the Connar decision has been reaffirmed. In Martz v.
Trecker,65 the Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that in circumstances similar
to Hauboldt, the lower court was correct to include in the jury instructions
the negligence of a non-party tortfeasor, even though it had no bearing on the
amount of the plaintiff's recovery.66 The inclusion of non-parties in jury
deliberations was also affirmed in Zintek v. Perchik.67 The court restated that
a jury must have the opportunity to consider anyone who may have
contributed to the tortious act.68 However, under the facts of the case, the
defendants failed to meet the threshold evidentiary standard of law because,
according to the court, they did not produce sufficient evidence to warrant
submission of the matter to the jury.69
As noted above, Wisconsin also includes settling co-defendants in jury
instructions when apportioning fault among several defendants.70 One type of
settlement procedure is known as a "Pierringer release" and is used in
several states other than Wisconsin.71 For example, Minnesota also uses this
same system for the treatment of settling defendants.72 In the case of
64. See id. See also York v. National Continental Ins. Co., 463 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990) (distinguishing Connar and holding that where there is no causal negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, there is no prejudice from failure to include the immune employer in the special verdict
question).
65. 535 N.W.2d 57 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995).
66. See id. at 61. Plaintiff, Marilyn Martz, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Young, which
was struck by defendant Trecker. A jury found that both Young, the non-party driver, and Trecker, the
defendant, were negligent and apportioned negligence accordingly. See id. at 58.
67. 471 N.W.2d 522 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
68. See id. at 528.
69. See id. at 528-29. Plaintiffs sued two doctors in a medical malpractice action. The court held
that in the medical malpractice setting, in order for the Connar standard to be satisfied, the remaining
defendants must have expert testimony to introduce the negligence of non-parties. Because this
standard was not met, the court upheld the lower court decision to exclude the evidence, while
affirming the Connar standard as still good law. See id.; see also Spearing v. Nat'l Iron Co., 770 F.2d
87, 90 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that "the logic of the Wisconsin comparative negligence law requires
that the proportional fault of all tortfeasors be determined, whether or not they are named as
defendants. This is a necessary step in fixing the proportional fault of the plaintiff and of the named
defendant(s)") (citing Connar v. West Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis.
1975)).
70. See Connar, 227 N.W.2d 660.
71. This concept comes from Pierringer v. Hoger, 124 N.W.2d 106 (Wis. 1963), where the court
held that releases of joint tortfeasors may have several different legal effects, including partial
satisfaction of damages and cause of action, covenant not to sue, accord and satisfaction of whole
cause of action or discharge of liability. The true legal consequences of this release have a great effect
on the right to contribution for the defendants remaining in the lawsuit. For the purposes of this Note,
it is important to realize that whatever the contribution result, the settling party still is assigned a
percentage of fault to properly assess the nonsettling party's fault.
72. Minnesota, like Wisconsin, also allows a jury to consider all parties to the transaction when
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Rambaum v. Swisher,73 the Minnesota Supreme Court stated some of the
characteristics of the Pierringer settlement.74 Generally, in this type of
settlement, the tort-feasor settles for a specified percentage of the damage
award as determined by the jury. So, in actuality, the settlement is for a fixed
percentage of the jury's yet-to-be-determined damage award.75 The court
held that when this settlement method is used, the amount of the settlement is
not used to reduce the remaining defendants' liability pro tanto.76 According
to the court, this would be contrary to the intentions of the settling parties,
who had previously agreed to deduct from the verdict the portion of damages
equal to the agreed upon percentage of the settling defendant's fault.77 The
result of this type of settlement is similar to the result found in New Jersey
when dealing with a settling co-defendant. Both the plaintiff and the settling
co-defendant take the risk of a bad settlement, and of either paying too much
or accepting too little for the release.78 However, in either case, the remaining
apportioning fault. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (West 1996), which states that:
The court may, and when requested by any party shall, direct the jury to find separate special
verdicts determining the amount of damages and the percentage of fault attributable to each party;
and the court shall then reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of fault
attributable to the person recovering.
Id.; see also Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978), where the court held that when some of the
defendants have settled with the plaintiff, the settling defendants' negligence is to be submitted to the
jury even though they have been dismissed from the lawsuit. See id. at 896. The Minnesota Supreme
Court, citing the Wisconsin cases of Pierringer, and Payne v. Bilco Co., 195 N.W.2d 641 (Wis. 1972),
further articulated that the apportionment shall include all parties whose negligence may have
contributed to the cause of action. See iL at 903. Regardless of whether they are parties to the lawsuit,
negligent parties may be liable to the plaintiff, either by operation of law or settlement release. Finally,
the court cited the Jury Instruction Guides to re-enforce their point.
In submitting the comparative fault question, the court must submit the names of all persons
whose conduct could be found to be negligent and contributing as a cause to the plaintiff's injury
or to the accident. If the total combined negligence is to equal 100%, then the percentage
contribution [of fault] by all persons whose conduct potentially contributed to the accident or the
injury, whether or not a party to the proceeding, must be submitted.
Lines, 272 N.W.2d at 903 (quoting 4 MINNESOTA PRACTICE, JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES, JIG II, 148
S, Comment, at 128 (2d ed. 1974)).
73. 435 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1989).
74. See id. at 22-23.
75. See id. In return for this, the plaintiff agrees to indemnify the settling tortfeasor for claims of
contribution by the nonsettling defendants. This assures the nonsettling defendants that they will not
pay more than their percentage share of the jury award. See Rambaum, 435 N.W.2d at 22.
76. See id. at 22-23.
77. See id.; see also Fry v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 922 (Minn. 1978) ("mhe Pierringer
release is based on the formula that each joint tortfeasor including the nonsettling defendant is liable
only for that part of the award which is his percentage of casual negligence. [T]he nonsettling
defendant is relieved from paying more than his fair share of the verdict....").
78. The Rambaum court noted that the fairness of the settlement is judged at the time it is made.
If the jury determinations subsequently result in the plaintiff receiving a windfall, or the defendant
settling for less than his fair share, this result is acceptable because of the law's strong encouraging of
settlements. See Ranbaum, 435 N.W.2d at 23.
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non-settling defendants are liable for only their proportion of fault as
allocated by the jury.
2. Florida9
[T]he court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis
of such party's percentage of fault .... 80
Florida's statutory language indicates that, similar to New Jersey and
Pennsylvania, juries can only consider parties who may be liable. The recent
case of Fabre v. Marin,8' however, has altered the comparative negligence
landscape in Florida.
The Fabre decision resolved a conflict between two lower court
decisions, Fabre v. Marin82 and Messmer v. Teacher's Insurance Co.83 In the
Fabre case, the lower court held that in creating the comparative fault statute,
the legislature did not intend to stop a fault-free plaintiff from recovering full
damages; rather, it intended to apportion liability only among tort-feasors
who were defendants in the lawsuit.8 4 In Messmer, the lower court reached
the opposite conclusion on a similar set of facts.85 The court reasoned:
The use of the word "party" [in the statute] simply describes an entity
against whom judgment is to be entered and is not intended as a word
of limitation. Had the legislature intended the apportionment
computation to be limited to the combined negligence of those who
happened to be parties to the proceeding, it would have so stated. The
79. For the discussion of Florida law, any reference to "damages" is limited to noneconomic
damages.
80. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.81(3) (West 1996) (emphasis added).
81. 623 So.2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
82. 597 So. 2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
83. 588 So. 2d 610 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).
84. See Fabre, 597 So. 2d at 885. In this case, Ann Marin was injured while riding in a car driven
by her husband Ramon. Mrs. Marin sued Marie Fabre, claiming Fabre's vehicle negligently changed
lanes in front of the Marins' vehicle, causing the accident. The defendant requested apportionment of
fault between Mrs. Fabre and Mr. Marin, who was immune because of interspousal tort immunity. The
court, however, ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment against Mr. Matin, who was an
immune non-party. The court noted that the statute was ambiguous in its definition of the word "party"
and chose to apply the definition of "all litigants" instead of "all participants in the accident." Id. at
883-85.
85. In Messmer, plaintiffAnn Messmer was riding in an automobile being driven by her husband
when they collided with Waldron, who was uninsured. The defendant was the insurance company that
had issued a $300,000 policy to Messmer for uninsured motorist coverage. The trial court found that
Waldron was 20% at fault, and Mr. Messmer was 80%. Mrs. Messmer argued that the comparative
negligence law required apportionment among the actual parties to the suit, not to immune non-parties,
such as her husband. The court disagreed with her argument and ruled accordingly. See Messmer, 588
So. 2d at 611-12.
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plain meaning of the word percentage is a proportionate share of the
whole, and this meaning should apply in the absence of any language
altering or limiting the plain meaning.
In 1993, the Supreme Court of Florida resolved this conflict in Fabre v.
Main,87 by upholding the decision of the Messmer court.88 The court
concluded that the comparative negligence statute was unambiguous, and
that 'judgment should be entered against each party liable on the basis of that
party's percentage of fault.'4 9 Furthermore, the court noted that the only way
to determine a party's percentage of fault is to compare that party's actions to
all of the other parties who contributed to the accident, regardless of whether
they have been or could have been liable to the plaintiff and joined as
defendants. 9
This point of law was confirmed in Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Fox,9' a case
decided the same day as Fabre v. Marin that answered a certified question
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, concerning
the interpretation of Florida's comparative negligence statute.92 On the
strength of Fabre v. Marin, the Florida Supreme Court answered the United
States Court of Appeals that an immune employer should have liability
apportioned to it even though it can have no further liability to the plaintiff in
order to properly determine the actual defendant's fault.93
Florida's treatment of settling co-defendants is similar to that of New
86. Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 611-12. See also Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984). The
Messmer court also noted that the purpose of the statue was to partially eliminate the doctrine ofjoint
and several liability, and not to include the fault of a non-party in the jury's allocation of fault would
thwart this intent. See Messmer, 588 So. 2d at 612.
87. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
88. See id.
89. Id. at 1185. For example, under the Fabre facts, the defendant's percentage of fault was 50%.
To accept a contrary reading of the statute would "require the entry of a judgment against [defendant]
in excess of their percentage of fault and directly contrary to the wording of the statute." Id.
90. See id. at 1185. The court noted that the California Supreme Court has ruled similarly in
reading a comparable California statute. In DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992), the
court, reviewing a statute that provided that each defendant shall be liable only for the percentage of
damages equal to their percentage of fault, held that this required a determination of the percentage of
fault of all entities that contributed to the accident, not only those who had been joined as defendants.
91. 623 So. 2d 1180 (Fla. 1993).
92. 966 F.2d 626 (11 th Cir. 1992). The circumstances of the case were as follows: the plaintiff,
Kevin Fox, was working for Eastern Airlines when he caught his fingers on an Allied aircraft fan with
an unattached safety screen. Eastern Airlines was immune from suit under the Worker's Compensation
Act, FLA. STAT. Ch. 440 § 440.11 (1996), but the defendant wanted the airline's fault included in the
jury deliberations because of its noncompliance with OSHA standards. See id.
93. See Allied-Signal, 623 So. 2d at 1181 (citing Nance v. Gulf Oil Corp., 817 F.2d 1176 (5th
Cir. 1987); Johnson v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223 (8th Cir. 1981); DaFonte v. Up-
Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992); Connar v. West Shore Equip. Co., 227 N.W.2d 660 (Wis.
1975)).
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Jersey and consistent with their own treatment of non-parties. For example,
in DeWitt Excavating, Inc. v. Walters,94 the court reiterated the doctrine
established in Fabre v. Main:95 a defendant is responsible for the portion of
damages that is equivalent to the percentage of fault attributable to that
defendant.96 However, unlike New Jersey, Wisconsin, and Minnesota,
plaintiffs in Florida cannot recover more than the jury awarded damages.97
3. Other States
Several other states also define "party" as all persons involved in the
transaction. For example, interpreting the Kansas comparative negligence
statute,98 the Kansas Supreme Court in Brown v. Keill,99 the Supreme Court
94. 642 So. 2d 833 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
95. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
96. See DeWitt, 642 So. 2d at 833-34; see also A.W. Chesterson v. Fisher, 655 So. 2d 170 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (reaffirming the Fabre doctrine that a jury must apportion fault to alleged
tortfeasors who have settled with the plaintiff before trial); Schindler Elevator Corp. v. Viera, 644 So.
2d 563 (Fla. Dist. Ct App. 1994) (holding that it is reversible error ifa lower court fails to include the
settling defendant in the special jury verdict).
97. The DeWitt court described the following procedure for determining the amount each
defendant owes in a case where one of the defendants has settled with the plaintiff:
Step 1) Multiply each nonsettling defendant's percentage of liability by the noneconomic
damages awarded by the jury to determine the amount each nonsettling defendant owes the
plaintiff.
Step 2) If there has been a settlement, apply the same formula to determine the amount the
settling defendant would have owed pursuant to the jury verdict.
A) If the amount settled for is less than the amount the settling would have owed, the remaining
defendants pay their amount owed without regard to the settlement.
B) If the amount settled for is greater than the amount the settling defendant would have owed,
the remaining defendant(s) are entitled to have the amount they owe reduced proportionately.
DeWitt, 642 So. 2d at 834.
98. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1995) reads as follows:
(b) Where the comparative negligence of the parties in any such action is an issue, the jury shall
return special verdicts, or in the absence of a jury, the court shall make special findings,
determining the percentage of negligence attributable to each of the parties, and determining the
total amount of damages sustained by each of the claimants.... (c) On motion of any party
against whom a claim is asserted for negligence resulting in death, personal injury, property
damage or economic loss, any other person whose causal negligence is claimed to have
contributed to such death, personal injury, property damage or economic loss, shall be joined as an
additional party to the action. (d) Where the comparative negligence of the parties in any action is
an issue and recovery is allowed against more than one party, each such party shall be liable for
that portion of the total dollar amount awarded as damages to any claimant in the proportion that
the amount of such party's causal negligence bears to the amount of the causal negligence
attributed to all parties against whom such recovery is allowed.
Id.
99. 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978). The plaintiff, Britt Brown, was a car owner who was involved in
an accident while his son was driving his car. The jury found the defendant driver 10% negligent and
entered judgment against her for 10% of the total damage award. The son was not made a defendant of
the suit. See id.
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of Kansas ruled that the purpose of the Kansas comparative negligence
statute was to "equate recovery and duty to pay to degree of fault"'' 0 The
court went on to hold that the language in part (d) of the statute, which reads
"all parties against whom such recovery is allowed," 101 must be read to
impose liability for damages based on the relative fault of all parties to the
transaction or occurrence, even when one or more parties cannot be joined as
a defendant or held liable to the plaintiff.
10 2
For other examples of states using this definition of "party", see
California,'0 3 New Mexico,'04 and Oklahoma0 5 cases.
100. Id. at 873-74. The court also stated that
there is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault paying 100% of the loss, and
there is no social policy that should compel defendants to pay more than their fair share of the
loss. Plaintiffs now take the parties as they find them. If one of the parties at fault happens to be a
spouse or a governmental agency and if by reason of some compelling social policy the plaintiff
cannot receive payment for his injuries from the spouse or agency, there is no compelling social
policy which requires the codefendant to pay more than his fair share of the loss. The same is true
if one of the defendants is wealthy and the other is not.
Id.
101. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a(1995).
102. See Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867 (Kan. 1978). In resolving this issue, the court answered
several other questions. First, the court held that the comparative negligence statute "permit[s] a
defendant in a comparative negligence case to bring in other joint tort-feasors so their percentage of
fault can be determined and their liability, if any, adjudged." Id. at 875. Second, the court held that if
this party has a valid defense such as interspousal immunity or a covenant not to sue, this will not
defeat the intention of the statute of assigning that party a percentage of fault even though they cannot
be liable to the plaintiff. See id. at 876.
It appears after considering the intent and purposes of the entire statute that such a party's fault
should be considered in each case to determine the other defendant's percentage of fault and
liability, if any. The proportionate liability.., under K.SA. § 60-258a(d) should not be increased
merely because a party joined under subsection (c) has a valid defense to plaintiff's claim, other
than lack of negligence.
Id.
For other Kansas cases on this point of law, see Cerretti v. Flint Hills Rural Elec. Cooperative
Ass'n, 837 P.2d 330, 347 (Kan. 1992) ("The [comparative negligence) statute was enacted to impose
individual liability for damages based on the proportionate fault of all the parties to the occurrence
which gave rise to the injuries and damages in a single action whenever possible.").
103. See DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140 (Cal. 1992) (stating that § 1431.2 requires a
determination of the percentage of fault of all entities who contributed to the accident rather than only
those who had been joined as defendants).
104. See Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc., 646 P.2d 579 (N.M. 1982) (stating that the
defendant should not be held liable for the negligence of an unknown driver who contributed to the
accident).
105. See Paul v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 624 P.2d 68, 70 (Okla. 1980) ("To limit the jury to viewing the
negligence of only one tortfeasor and then ask it to apportion that negligence to the overall wrong is to
ask it to judge a forest by observing just one tree. It cannot, and more important should not, be done.").
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IV. PROPOSAL
When states determine the best way to set up a system of fault
comparison in a tort setting, there are many factors that need to be
considered. These include efficiency of the court system, compensation of
the plaintiff for their injuries, and proper allocation of the damages to the
defendants who are involved in the litigation. The following proposed statute
would help to accomplish these goals. This Note proposes that states,
especially New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Oregon, consider the merits of the
statute and adopt similar legislation.
State X Comparative Negligence Statute
A) In all suits alleging negligence or wrongful death, the
negligence of the plaintiff shall not serve as a bar to recovery.
B) The jury or fact finder shall make the following findings of fact:
1) the percentage fault of the defendant(s) in the suit;
2) the percentage fault of the plaintiff(s) in the suit; and
3) the percentage fault of all parties not in the suit who have
contributed to the accident or transaction at issue-this shall include
the following categories of parties: settling co-defendants, immune
parties (including spousal immunity, worker's compensation bar, etc.),
parties who have signed a covenant not to sue, and any party involved
in the transaction who the plaintiff has chosen not to sue.
C) A fact finder shall not consider the fault of any party in Section
(B)(3) who is:
1) not identifiable (i.e., a phantom tort-feasor); or
2) any party designated in (B)(3) unless, as a matter of law,
there is evidence of conduct, which, if believed by the jury, would
constitute negligence on the part of the person or other legal entity
inquired about
D) Each party in (B)(1), (2), and (3) shall be assigned a percentage
of fault so that the total of all fault assigned is 100%. The fact finder
shall make a determination of the total damages awarded to the
plaintiff, and each defendant shall be liable for the percentage of that
damage award equal to that party's percentage of fault. Under no
circumstances shall a party be liable for a dollar amount greater than
that which their percentage of fault dictates.
E) A jury shall not be made aware of the dollar amount of any
previous settlement the plaintiff has made with a defendant(s). That
party shall be still assigned a percentage of fault. There is no alteration
to any liability of any defendant if the plaintiff receives more or less in
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the settlement than they would have received from that party had they
not settled, based on that party's percentage of fault. This section shall
be read to allow a plaintiff to recover more or less than the damages a
jury awards based on whether they settled for more or less than a
defendant's percentage of the damage award. If a plaintiff settles with
a defendant who is later found to have 0% fault, the remaining
defendants are not entitled to any reduction in damages.
This proposed statute has several features that help accomplish the above
stated goals.
A. Section A-Comparative Negligence
Section A makes clear that the statute eliminates all links to a system of
contributory negligence. 1°6 A plaintiff should not be denied all recovery
simply because he has some fault in the transaction at issue.
107
B. Section B-Jury Allocation of Fault
Sections B(l) and B(2) simply state the obvious, that the plaintiff and
defendant(s) are all to receive a percentage of fault from the jury. Subsection
(3) mandates that all entities involved in the accident are allocated a
percentage of fault, assuming they meet the two conditions of section C: (1)
they are identifiable; and (2) they meet the required evidentiary standard.
1. Immune Parties
If juries do not consider immune parties, then a defendant who is partially
liable may end up paying more than his true share of fault. For example,
consider a hypothetical involving an employer that is immune because of the
workers' compensation bar.'08 Plaintiff is employed by ABC Company,
which has a solid waste container behind its facilities.109 The defendant is a
106. According to O'Connor & Sreenan, Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina and Virginia have
retained systems of contributory negligence. See O'Connor & Sreenan, supra note 3, at 381.
107. See supra notes 5-21 and accompanying text (discussing contributory versus comparative
negligence).
108. See STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 729-49
(1993). Employers are barred from further liability to an employee because of the exclusivity of the
workers' compensation remedy. "Exclusivity is one of the founding principles of workers'
compensation. In exchange for a no-fault system (which benefited workers), workers' compensation
became the exclusive remedy against the employer for a worker injured on the job (which benefited
employers)." Id. at 729.
109. This hypothetical is based on Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries of South Jersey, Inc., 476
A.2d 304 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984).
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solid waste hauler that leased the container to ABC Co., who is immune from
liability because of the state's workers' compensation statute. In its
operations, the defendant, creates a rut in the ground while hauling the
container, and the plaintiff, while rolling a large drum of solid waste, trips on
the rut, which was recently covered with snow.'I 0 Assuming 25% negligence
to the plaintiff (as the jury found in the Ramos case), 1 there is no reason
why the defendant, the solid waste hauler, should be responsible for 75% of
the damages, without a jury contemplating that the employer, ABC Co., may
have some fault for failing to clear the lot where the plaintiff was injured. A
defendant should not be responsible for damages greater than its fault merely
because it has found itself in the unfortunate circumstance of being a joint
tort-feasor with an immune party.'
12
A named defendant should not be forced to bear some percentage of
negligence or fault that rightfully belongs to someone else, even if that
other party is immune [or] nonliable. In some situations, this may
mean that the plaintiff cannot obtain satisfaction of a judgment for all
of the negligence or fault the jury attributes to the nonparty. However,
at least the named defendant is not forced to shoulder blame that
belongs elsewhere.
1 13
2. Nonparties
Parties that a plaintiff has simply chosen not to sue, possibly for personal
reasons, also should be included in the jury deliberations on the allocation of
fault. Plaintiffs control the litigation by deciding the jurisdiction and the
venue, as well as deciding when to commence the suit. Plaintiffs should not
110. In Ramos, the court refused to allow the jury to allocate negligence to the employer, who was
not liable to the plaintiff because of the workers' compensation bar. The court held that "[a] truer
verdict is more likely to be returned where the fact finder's attention is ultimately fixed on the conduct
of the parties who will be affected by the verdict." Ramos, 476 A.2d at 309.
Ill. Seeid.at306.
112. The Wisconsin cases ofHauboldt v. Union Carbide Corp., 467 N.W.2d 508 (Wis. 1991), see
supra notes 61-64, and York v. National Continental Insurance Co., 463 N.W.2d 364 (Wis. Ct. App,
1990), held that where there is no causal negligence on the part of the plaintiff, there is no prejudice
from failure to include the immune or non-party from the jury's consideration. However, these courts
have missed the point of including non-parties in the jury's allocation of fault. In negligence cases, the
point of such a distribution of fault is so the defendants who are in the case do not end up paying more
than their own proportion of fault. By only allowing this to occur when there is fault on the part of the
plaintiff, the court creates a situation of uncertainty. For instance, when the issue of plaintiff's
negligence is disputed, should the court allow evidence of non-parties' fault, but allow the jury to
consider that evidence if it assigns any fault to the plaintiff?.
113. Kurt G. Stiegelmeier, Designation of Immune, Nonliable, and Unknown Nonparlies, 22
COLO. LAW. 31, 31 (1993).
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be able to force a "deep pocket" defendant to pay more than their
proportionate share of damages by choosing not to sue a party, possibly
because the party is insolvent Plaintiffs must take defendants as they find
them.1
4
For example, take the following hypothetical. The plaintiff steps off a bus
at a bus stop, crosses in front of the bus, and as the plaintiff is crossing the
street, he is hit by a car traveling in the opposite direction. Assume that the
car that hits the plaintiff is driven by a woman who is soon to file for
bankruptcy. Learning this before filing suit, the plaintiff quickly settles with
the driver for a small sum and signs a covenant not to sue her. Therefore the
plaintiff sues only the bus company, knowing that the driver of the car would
be unable to satisfy any large judgment. Under the laws of New Jersey1 15 and
Pennsylvania,' 6 the jury would only be able to allocate fault to the plaintiff
and to the bus company, the parties to the suit. 117 This result is completely
unfair to the defendant bus company." 8 With the control over the litigation
that the plaintiff has from a procedural standpoint, the plaintiff should not be
allowed to force a defendant to pay more damages by not joining a particular
party." 9 The plaintiff, not the bus company, should shoulder the risk of being
114. See Julie O'Daniel McClellan, Note, Apportioning Liability to Nonparties in Kentucky Tort
Actions: A Natural Extension of Comparative Fault or a Phantom Scapegoat for Negligent
Defendants?, 82 KY. L.J. 789, 816 (1994) (under Kentucky law, plaintiff can "no longer avoid
apportionment and recover fully from a defendant who is only partially at fault by not bringing an
action against a negligent friend, relative, or financially unstable tortfeasor. The defendant can prevent
such a result by bringing a third-party claim against the unnamed joint tortfeasor."). Dix & Associate
Pipeline Contractors, Inc. v. Key, 799 S.W.2d 24 (Ky. 1990), was the first case in which the Kentucky
Supreme Court held in favor of apportionment of liability to a nonparty, and to an employer immune
because of the workers' compensation bar.
115. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2 (West 1996).
116. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7102 (1996).
117. However, according to the court in Straley v. United States, 887 F. Supp. 728 (D.N.J. 1995),
the bus company defendant would be able to introduce the negligence of the insolvent car driver as an
intervening cause, which means that the defendant would have to show that the intervening cause was
100% liable for the resulting accident.
118. See Fabre v. Main, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1185-86 (Fla. 1993). The court held that:
a result where a party involved in the accident but who is not assigned a percentage of fault defies
common sense. It would be incongruous that the legislature would have intended that the
[defendant's] responsibility be 100% in situations where [plaintiff's] vehicle was operated by her
husband and only 50% in situation where by chance she was a passenger in a vehicle operated by
[a driver who was not immune].
Id.
119. See id. at 1186. In Fabre the court concluded that:
The legislature decided that ... a plaintiff should take each defendant as he or she finds them. If a
defendant is insolvent, the judgment of liability of another defendant is not increased. The statute
requires the same result where a potential defendant is not or cannot be joined as a party to the
lawsuit.
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involved in an accident with a third party who is unable to pay her
proportionate share of liability.
C. Section C-Unidentifiable Parties and the Evidentiary Standard
There are two criteria that must be met before a jury may consider the
fault of an entity that is not a party to the suit.
1. Unidentifiable Parties
Allowing a defendant to argue that a party who cannot be identified is at
fault takes the concept of fairness to the defendant too far. Parties that are
immune and parties that settle should not cause a defendant to pay more than
his proportionate share of damages, because these parties are out of the case
either by action of the legislature or of the plaintiff. However, a phantom
tortfeasor is not present because of his own elusiveness. The plaintiff, who
may not recover his full damage award because of fault designated to an
immune party or settling defendant, should not be denied recovery because
of the fault of an unidentifiable party. An example of this situation is
Bencivenga v. J.J.A.MM, Inc. 120 In this case, the plaintiff brought a personal
injury suit against a dance club after an unknown tortfeasor hit him in the
face with a bottle. The court denied the defendant's request to apportion fault
to the unnamed tort feasor1
2 1
2. Evidentiary Standard
The second criteria is that an immune or non-present party must, as a
matter of law, meet the threshold evidentiary standard that there is evidence
of conduct, which, if believed by the jury, would constitute negligence on the
part of the person or of the other legal entity about whom such evidence is
introduced. 122 The purpose of this threshold is to place limits on the
120. 609 A.2d 1299 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992).
121. The court noted that "a fictitious person is not someone against whom recovery can be sought
because ... due process prevent[s] entry of judgment against a person designated by a fictitious
name." Id. at 1303.
122. This same legal standard is used in both Wisconsin and Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 604.01 (West 1996); Johnson v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, 666 F.2d 1223, 1226 (8th Cir. 1981).
Under the Minnesota comparative negligence statute ... , "(if) there is 'evidence of conduct
which, if believed by the jury would constitute negligence (or fault) on the part of the person...
inquired about,' the fault or negligence of that person should be submitted to the jury" even
though that person is not party to the lawsuit.
Frey v. Snelgrove, 269 N.W.2d 918, 923 (Minn. 1978) (citing Connar v. West Shore Equip., Inc., 227
N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1975)); see also Lines v. Ryan, 272 N.W.2d 896 (Minn. 1978); WiS. STAT.
ANN. § 895.045 (West 1996); Connar, 227 N.W.2d at 663.
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defendant's right to have fault allocated by the jury. If a non-party does not
meet this evidentiary standard, then it would be too distracting for the jury to
hear evidence about it. While a defendant should be permitted to display
evidence of a party who may be at fault, this right should not extend so far as
to bring in evidence of a party who cannot meet this standard, for this will
only serve to take the focus away from the parties who are involved in the
matter.1
23
D. Section D-Apportionment ofMonetary Damages
Section D clarifies that no party shall be liable for more than their fair
share of damages. To calculate each party's liability, simply multiply the
total damages award with a particular defendant's percentage of fault. No
defendant can be liable for more than that amount.
E. Section E-Settling Parties
The final section of the statute addresses the way a court shall treat parties
who have settled with the plaintiff. The text of this section follows the
treatment of settling defendants in New Jersey. 124 Under this statute, a
settling party is assigned a percentage of fault, and the remaining parties are
to pay the proportion of damages equal to their own percentage of fault. This
system may allow a plaintiff to recover more or less than the jury awarded
damages.'2 However, these results are acceptable in the context of
encouraging settlement, which will increase the efficiency of the judicial
system.
123. See Bryan Aylstock, Phantom Tortfeasors: Parties for the Jury to Consider in its
Apportionment of Fault?, 45 FLA. L. REV. 733, 742 (1993) (allowing jury apportionment of fault
among all parties to the transaction "places Florida plaintiffs in the unenviable position of having to
defend an absent tortfeasor because many of the tortfeasors named in lawsuits will undoubtedly
concentrate their defense on blaming the empty chair"). While this is a valid criticism of allowing the
jury to allocate fault to immune and non-parties, the evidentiary standard used in this Note's proposed
statute, as well as in Wisconsin and Minnesota, alleviates some of these problems by creating a
minimum level of proof that must be met before evidence of that party's negligence can be presented
to the jury.
124. See Young v. Latta, 589 A.2d 1020 (N.J. 1991).
125. For example, assume plaintiff (P) sues defendants (D1, D2 and D3) in a suit resulting from a
four car collision. Plaintiff settles with Dl for $60,000, and the jury awards $100,000 in damages and
allocates negligence as follows: P-25%; DI-25%; D2-25%; D3-25%.
Had there been no settlement, each defendant would be liable for $25,000, and plaintiff would
recover a total of $75,000. However, as a result of the settlement, D2 and D3 are still liable for
$25,000 each, but plaintiff ends up recovering $110,000, more than the jury award of damages. Had
the plaintiff's settlement with DI been for $10,000, plaintiff would then only recover a total of
$60,000; less than the jury award of damages.
19981
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V. CONCLUSION
In a negligence action involving multiple defendants, the fates of the
various parties are determined by how the jury allocates fault. When a jury
can only allocate fault to the parties in the litigation, then defendants may be
forced to pay more than their fair share of the damages if there are parties to
the transaction who cannot be liable to the plaintiff, whom the plaintiff has
not made a party to the suit, or who have already settled with the plaintiff.126
However, when a jury allocates fault to all parties in a transaction, then each
defendant can be confident that they only will be liable for their share of
damages equivalent to their share of fault.127 Fairness and efficiency dictate
that all parties to a transaction should be assigned a percentage of fault. This,
in addition to being fair to the defendant, takes some power away from
plaintiffs, who in a jurisdiction like New Jersey or Pennsylvania, can choose
not to sue insolvent parties, so that "deep-pockets" will be forced to pay the
damages, even if they are not entirely at fault. These results can be avoided
by the enactment of the statute proposed by this Note.
Daniel Levi
126. See supra note 28 and accompanying text,
127. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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